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From the Bankrupcy Courts
Alan N. Resnick*

Can Low Market Value of Debt
Securities Render a Corporation
Solvent for Preference ·
Purposes? A Surprising
Decision From Delaware

Suppose that a corporation has assets worth $100 million and liabilities that include $150 million (face
amount) of outstanding publiclyheld bonds. The corporation's other
liabilities consist of $5 million in
trade debt. Although it is current on
interest payments, it is behind <>n
most of its trade debt because of serious cash flow problems and declining sales volume. Because of its
bleak financial condition, increasing
competition, and negative publicity,
its bonds have been trading at a discount and could be purchased on the
market for only 60 percent of their
face value. Suppose further that,
during this period of impending
doom, the corporation wires a late
$100,000 payment on an old unsecured debt to its favorite and most

loyal trade creditor, and then files a
chapter 11 petition a few days later.
The likely reaction of an experienced-or even inexperiencedbankruptcy lawyer hearing these
facts would be to identify the
$100,000 payment as a preference
that may be recovered under Section
547 of the Bankruptcy Code.' The
late payment of an unsecured antecedent debt-clearly not paid in the
ordinary course of business-within
ninety days before bankruptcy
should set off alarms and flashing
lights (or anyone interested in recovering the money for the benefit of
the bankruptcy estate. But a transfer
is I).Ot a voidable preference unless,
among other requirements, the
debtor is insolvent at the time of the
transfer. 2 The term "insolvent" is
defined in the Bankruptcy Code to
mean, when the debtor is a corporation, "financial condition such that
the sum of such entity's debts is
greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation."3

* Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, N.Y.;
Counsel to the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson, New York, N.Y.; Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference of
the United States; member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference. The views expressed in this article are the author's own.

11 usc§ 547.
11 usc§ 547(b)(3).
3 11 USC § 101(32). The Bankruptcy
Code definition also provides that property
transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or default creditors is
to be excluded when determining whether
an entity is insolvent.
This "balance sheet" test is significantly
different than the definition of "insolvent"
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Was this corporation "ipsolvent"
when it paid tlie $100,000 debt? Because of a recent decision of the federal district court In re Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 4 it appears that there
is now some support, at least in
Delaware, for the position that this
fictitious corporation-with $100
million worth of assets and $150
million in bond debt-was not insol vent under the Bankruptcy Code's
"balance sheet" test and, therefore,
that the payment could not be recovered as a preference.
The TWA Case
Eighty-eight days before Trans
World Airlines (TWA) filed a bankruptcy petition in 1991, it deposited
$13.7 million with the clerk of the
district court in the Southern District
of New York as security for payment
of a judgment in favor of Travellers
International AG (Travellers) and
against TWA. The purpose of the
deposit was to stay enforcement of
the judgment pending an appeal.
TWA, as a chapter 11 debtor in possession, commenced an adversary
proceeding to recover the cash deposit, successfully arguing in the
bankruptcy court that the deposit
gave Travellers a preference under
often found in other statutes, including Section 1-201 of the ·ucc which renders an
entity insolvent if it either satisfies the Bankruptcy Code insolvency test, or "has ceased
to pay its debts in the ordinary course of
business or cannot pay its debts as they become due."
4
203 BR 890 (D. Del. 1996).

Section 547(b) of the Code. 5 In its
decision, the bankruptcy court found
that TWA was insolvent at the time
of the cash deposit, in part because
of the face amount of its outstanding debt securities. 6
On appeal, the district court was
faced with the issue of whether TWA
was ':insolvent" when the cash deposit was made.
Valuation of Assets
In determining whether TWA was
insolvent at the time of the cash deposit, the bankruptcy court first focused on the asset side of the balance
sheet. It engaged in a lengthy analysis of the meaning of the phrase "fair
valuation" found in the definition of
"insolvent," including an in-depth
discussion of case law under both the
former Bankruptcy Act and the
present Code. The bankruptcy court
then reached several general conclusions:

D The prevailing and proper ap-

D

proach to the valuation of assets of an operating company
is to determine the "going concern value" of assets, rather
than the forecJosure or forcedsale liquidation value.
Balance sheet numbers prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) do notre-

5
The Official Unsecured Creditors'
Committee intervened in the adversary proceeding as a party-plaintiff.
6 180 BR 389 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994).
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fleet the true going concern
value of assets. As the bankruptcy court pointed out in a
footnote, "[f]inancial statements prepared in accordance
with [GAAP] do not record assets at fair market value. Instead, they are recorded at the
historical original purchase
cost and reduced each year by
an estimate of depreciation." 7
Therefore, they may serve only
as a starting point for the analysis, subject to additions and
deletions based on expert testimony of appraisers and accountants.
D The proper way to determine
the going concern value of assets is to predict the amount of
cash that could be realized in a
sale of the assets within a reasonable period of time. The
bankruptcy court rejected the
notion that the going concern
value approach requires asset
valuation on the assumption
that they will not be sold, but
will remain "in place" indefinitely to generate income for
the debtor. "Like the preference
creditor, other creditors can
only benefit by being paid.
Consequently ... § 547(b)(3)
insolvency analysis requires a
determination of the amount of
funds which could be generated by converting non-cash
assets into cash." 8

7
8

180 BRat 405, n. 22.,
180 BRat 411.
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If a going concern valuation requires a prediction as to the cash that
could be received in a hypothetical
asset sale, then how does thaf approach differ from a forced sale or
liquidation value approach? The difference is in the timing. The going
concern approach is based on the
proceeds of a hypothetical sale over
a reasonable period of time, rather
than immediately in a foreclosuretype setting. In this case, the bankruptcy court held that TWA's
approximation of a twelve- to eighteen-month time period for an orderly sale of assets was. reasonable.
Based on these principles, the
bankruptcy court engaged in an asset-by-asset analysis-focusing on
such non-cash assets as leased flight
equipment, aircraft and spare engines, gates and slots, and maintenance facilities-to arrive at their
fair market going concern value. The
court concluded that the aggregate
fair value of TWA's assets on the
date of the transfer was approximately $3.1 billion.
On appeal, the district court agreed
with the bankruptcy court's analysis and conclusions regarding the fair
value of TWA's assets. The district
court also addressed an apparent inconsistency between (1) the requirement that a going concern valuation
must be based on a hypothetical sale
that will take place within a reasonable time (twelve to eighteen months
in this case) after the date on which
the alleged preference took place and
(2) the requirement that, under Section 547(b), a solvency determination must be made on the date of the
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transfer. But the district court found
a way to reconcile these two requirements:
While it is generally accepted that
assets must be valued at the time of
the transfer, few courts have examined the purpose underlying this requirement..From a review of the case
law on this point, it appears the purpose of determining solvency on the
transfer date is to avoid valuing· assets based on the intervening bankruptcy. [footnote omitted]. Therefore,
reconciling these points requires that
the hypothetical sale over a reasonable period of time take into account
the debtor's situation on the date of
the transfer, and not the debtor's situation during the ensuing ·period of
bankruptcy. Thus, while a twelve to
eighteen month time frame would realistically place the sale in the period
of bankruptcy, because the sale is hypothetical, it must be based on the
conditions at the time ef transfer and
not at the time of bankruptcy, as it
would if one was realistically counting the 12 to 18 months.9

Determining the Amount of
Liabilities
Turning to the liability side of the
balance sheet, both the bankruptcy
and district courts agreed that contingent obligations must be included.
In general, the amount of contingent
obligations must be determined by
multiplying the dollar amount of
potential liability by the "probability that the contingency will occur
and the liability will become real." 10
203 BR at 896.
180 BR at427. Both courts cited In re
Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F2d 198,
200 (7th Cir. 1988), as authority for the
9

10

The district court also agre~d with
the bankruptcy court's general approach of measuring TWA's liabilities within the context of a
hypothetical sale of the business
within a twelve to eighteen month
period. For example, to determine
the liabilities. in connection with
TWA's pension plan, medical and
dental benefit plans, and estimated
wind-down expenses, the bankruptcy court assumed that the business would be terminated. As the
bankruptcy court wrote, "[i]f TWA
were required to wind down its operations and convert non-cash assets
to cash in a 12 to 18 month period,
its operations .would obviously terminate and the liabilities contingent
on that event would then become
fixed." 11 The district court held that,
"[b]ecause the Bankruptcy Court
found significant factual support for
its finding that absent a major capital restructuring, TWA was likely to
terminate its business, this Court
cannot say that the finding was
clearly erroneous." 12

Valuing Bond Debt
But the two courts differed on
whether, for the purpose of determining insolvency, TWA's publicly
held bonds should be considered liabilities. only to the extent of their
fair market value, rather than for
their full face value. The evidence
proposition that contingent liabilities must
be valued using a probability analysis.
11 180 BR at 427-428. ·
12
203 BR at 897-898.
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indicated that, at the time of the alleged preference, TWA's debt obligations with respect to its bonds was
approximately $1.77 billion (including face amount due on maturity plus
accrued interest), but that these
bonds could have been purchased on
the market for only $663 million. In
view of TWA's other liabilities,
whether the prepetition cash deposit
was a voidable preference depended
on which of these two figures should
be used in determining TWA's solvency.
The bankruptcy court focused on
the language of Section 101(32),
which bases the insolvency test on
whether "the sum of such entity's
debts is greater than all such entity's
property, at a fair valuation." The
word "debt" is defined in Section
101(12) to mean "liability on a
claim." Clearly, TWA:s liability to
the holders of its debt securities
would be for the full face amount of
the bonds, plus any accrued interest,
payable upon maturity.
The bankruptcy court also reasoned, from the phrasing of S~ction
101(32), that only property is to be
valued at fair market value, not liabilities.
Had Congress intended the meaning
ascribed by Traveller's [i.e., the fair
value approach applied to liabilities],
it could have easily drafted language
to so state. The section could have
read: "the sum of such entity's debts,
at a fair valuation, is greater than all
of such entity's property, at a fair valuation," or "at a fair valuation, the sum
of such entity's debts is greater than
all of such entity's property." 13
13

180 BRat 423.
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The bankruptcy court observed
that it would produce an anomalous
result if both assets and liabilities
were valued at fair market value.
Assuming that creditors are fully
informed of the debtor's financial
condition, and that asset values are
lower than the face amount of the
debtor's liabilities, creditors "would
never value their claims at more than
the value of the assets," and "the
fully informed debtor would never
pay claimants more than what claimants would be willing to take. Thus,
the value of the claims would never
exceed the value of the assets and
insolvency could never occur." 14
The bankruptcy court did not find
persuasive Travellers' argument that
the bond debt should be valued, for
insolvency test purposes, at the public trading price because'"!WA, if it
wanted to, could have bought the
bonds at that price rather than pay
the face amount at maturity. It also
rejected Traveller's argument that
the prevailing case law that requires
use of a probability analysis with respect to contingent obligations 15
mandates the use of fair market
value with respect to TWA:s debt
securities. A probability valuation
analysis should be used with respect
to contingent multi-obligor claims,
such as liability on a guaranty where
the debt has not yet matured. The
court's role in those situations is to

14

180 BRat 424.
See, e.g., Mellon Bank, NA v. Metro
Communications, Inc., 945 F2d 635 (3d Cir.
1991 ); In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841
F2d 198 (7th Cir. 1988).
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estimate the amount of the unliquidated claim. "They have no application here to the TWA publicly
traded deb{ obligations." 16
Based on this reasoning, the bankruptcy court held that the face
amount of the bonds must be used
in computing the total amount of liabilities for insolvency purposes.
District Court Rejects Face
Amount Valuation
The district court disagreed with
the bankruptcy court on whether the
modifier "at fair valuation" found in
§ 101(32) should apply to debts as
well as property. The district court
relied on language in Mellon Bank,
NA v. Metra Communications. Inc., 11
j
'
where the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit stated that "assets and
liabilities are tallit<d at fair valuation
to determine whether the corporation's debts exceed its assets." 18 The
district court rejected the bankruprcy
court's view that this quote from
Mellon Bank rnust be limited to the
context of that case, which involved
the assessment of the debtor's portion of an obligation shared by others. The district court concluded that,
since both property and debts must
be tallied at fair valuation, the bond
debt must be valued according to its
fair value at the time of the preferential transfer. "[B]ecause the Court
has concluded that liabilities should
be fairly evaluated, the Court does
16

180 BRat 424.
:945 F2d 635 (3d Cir. 1991).
18
945 F2d at 648.

conclude that the Bankruptcy
Court's decisiop to value the public
debt at face value was error." 19
Conclusion
How would the district court in
Delaware value the publicly-held
debt in the case of the fictitious corporation discussed at the beginning
of this article? If it is inappropriate
to use the face value of the bonds in
calculating the amount of debtwhich is what the district court held
in TWA-would that court value this
liability based on the price at which
the bonds were trading in the market place on the date of the preferential transfer?
Although the district court did not
explain in detail how it would determine fair value, it appears that it
probably· would look to the market
value of the bonds. If so, the district
court probably would hole\ that the
$100,000 payment in question was
not a voidc;tble preference. Assuming that the going concern value of
assets was $100 million, that the
$150 million in outstanding bonds
were trading at 60 percent of their
face value (for a fair market value
of $90 million), and that other debts
amounted to only $5 million, the
corporation would have been solvent
at the time of the payment. But if the
public had a little more confidence
in the corporation's financial future
so that its bonds were trading at 70
percent of their face value (for a fair
market value of $105 million) at the

1

19
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time of the $100,000 payment, then,
applying the district court's view in
TWA, the corporation probably
would have been insolvent and the
$100,000 would be recoverable as a
preference.
By not explaining exactly how it
would fairly value TWA's debt securities, it is possible that the district court was leaving the door open
to a method of valuation based on
the probability that the bondholders
will be paid at the end of the hypothetical sale of the debtor's assets
within a reasonable time? That is, if
it is likely that the proceeds of a "going concern" sale would produce
cash sufficient to pay <;mly 50 percent of the face amount of the bonds,
would the district coort approve an
approach that values the bond debt
at 50 percent of face value, regardless of their current trading price? If
so, it would be difficult to imagine
how any debtor could be considered
insoivent because the "fair value" of
the debtor's liabilities would never
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exceed the value of assets available
to pay them.
The district court's decision in
TWA could make it much more difficult for bankruptcy trustees and
debtors in possession to recover
preferences under Section 547(b)
because of the difficulty in finding
insolvency, at least when the debtor
has outstanding debt securities trading publicly at a discount. In addition, because the term "insolvent" is
used elsewhere in the Code, including in Section 548 on fraudulent
transfers and Section 546(c) on a
seller's right to reclaim goods, the
ramifications of the TWA decision
may extend well beyond preference
disputes. It also remains to be seen
whether the district court's holding
will be applied to a debt that is not
related to publicly traded debt secu"
rities but can be "fairly valued"
based on the creditor's willingness
to sell the claim to a third party or
on the probability that the claim will
be fully paid.
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